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Abstract  
This study seeks to take stock of where the LEPs are at and where they are heading by 
analysing their strategies and priorities, organisation and governance, resources, effectiveness 
and working relations, innovations, lessons learned, and future barriers and challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
Three years on from the proposal sent by the Secretaries of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (DBIS) and Communities and Local Government (DCLG) “to 
invite local groups of councils and business leaders to come together to consider how 
you wish to form local enterprise partnerships” in order “to work with the 
Government to help strengthen local economies”, a new landscape of economic 
development governance has emerged in England1. Since 2010, a total of 39 new 
‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs) have now been established and recognised by 
Central Government in the wake of the dismantling of the 8 sets of regional level 
arrangements outside London2 (Figure 1).  
 
Early assessments of the fledgling institutions have been mixed and, in some quarters, 
critical and sceptical. Reports from the Centre for Cities and The Work Foundation 
described uneven progress in getting started, lack of business engagement and even 
disenchantment, an acute shortage of resources, and doubts as to the longevity of 
LEPs3. The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Local Growth, Local 
Enterprise Partnerships and Enterprise Zones’ initial enquiry did not address the 
question of how effective the LEPs were but instead focused on recommendations, 
principally to Government, on preconditions for making them viable and sustainable 
including providing modest amounts of core funding to cover operational costs, 
consolidating the existing funding streams available to LEPs, and devolving funding 
and powers to LEP areas, building on the first wave of City Deals4. The Chief 
Economic Development Officers’ Society (CEDOS) and Association of Directors of 
Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport (ADEPT) report found that local 
authority support had proved critical to the development of LEPs5. The Smith 
                                                 
1 Letter from Vince Cable and Eric Pickles to Local Authority and Business Leaders, 29 June 2010. 
2 Pike, A., Tomaney, J., Coombes, M. and McCarthy, A. (2012) “Governing uneven development: the politics of local and 
regional development in England” in N. Bellini, M. Danson and H. Halkier (2012) (Eds.) Regional Development 
Agencies: The Next Generation?, Routledge: Abingdon, 102-121. 
3 Centre for Cities (2011) Cause Célèbre or Cause for Concern? Local Enterprise Partnerships One Year On, Centre for 
Cities: London and The Work Foundation (2012) The Business of Cities: The Private Sector, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships and Growth, The Work Foundation: London. 
4 APPG on local growth, local enterprise partnerships and enterprise zones (2012) Where next for LEPs? Report of an 
inquiry into effectiveness to date of Local Enterprise Partnerships, House of Commons: London. 
5 Walker, P. (2010) Local Authorities, Local Enterprise Partnerships and the Growth Agenda, First Report of Joint 
Research Project, CEDOS and ADEPT: Dorset. 
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between the structure, priorities and achievements of LEPs across England and called 
for LEPs to be equipped with statutory powers alongside minimal core annual 
funding9. The Smith Institute and Regional Studies Association’s further analysis 
argued that if LEPs were to perform effectively then they needed sufficient resources, 
such as assured revenue and access to capital and project funding10. The APPG’s 
report on LEPs and skills called on all political parties to make a manifesto 
commitment to devolve a well-resourced package of funding and responsibilities to 
LEPs and City Deals11. 
 
The Government’s initial response to Lord Heseltine’s report was positive indicating – 
in a Ministerial Foreword – that it would act “across the board on his 
recommendations” – and in particular on the proposals to establish a ‘Local Growth 
Fund’12. The 2013 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR 2013) confirmed the size of 
the Local Growth Fund (LGF) from 2015-16 (£2bn per annum), and identified a 
number of other funding streams that LEPs would have ‘strategic influence’ over by 
2020-2113. The size of the initial allocation to the LGF has disappointed many14, as it 
fell short of Lord Heseltine’s recommendation for a £12bn annual pot over four years. 
The part-competitive bidding process, that will determine LGF allocations, points 
towards the demonstration of effective strategy, governance and capacity as being 
critical to individual LEPs successfully winning a share of the new Fund.  
 
Three years on from their introduction, and against the backdrop of a mixed picture of 
their performance in a shifting context, it is timely to take stock of where the LEPs 
have got to and what issues they face for their future development. Building our 
understanding and analysis of empirical evidence from existing studies focused upon 
                                                 
9 CBI (2013) The UK’s Growth Landscape: Harnessing Private Sector Potential Across the Country, CBI: London. 
10 Ward, M. and Hardy, S. (2013) (Eds.) Where Next for Local Enterprise Partnerships?, The Smith Institute and Regional 
Studies Association: London and Seaford. 
11 APPG on local growth, local enterprise partnerships and enterprise zones (2013) Skills and Employment in the Age of 
Local Growth Deals, House of Commons: London. 
12 HM Treasury and DBIS (2013) Government’s Response to the Heseltine Review, HMT and DBIS: London. 
13 HMT (2013) Investing in Britain’s Future, HM Treasury: London. 
14 Jones, A. (2013) “Will the spending round crush urban growth?” New Statesman, 28 June 2013. Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2013/06/will-spending-round-crush-urban-growth 
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individual or groups of LEPs15, the aim of the study reported here was to undertake, at 
a point in time, the first national survey of all 39 LEPs in England and examine their 
current position and prospects. The methodology and research design were based on 
three connected elements: i) semi-structured interviews with Chairs and/or 
Chief/Senior Officers in all 39 LEPs (100% response rate; 13 (33%) were conducted 
face-to-face) undertaken between December 2012 and February 2013; ii) a review of 
secondary sources (e.g. LEP websites, The LEP Network reports, Government 
documents and independent studies)16; and, iii) a follow-up exercise to gather 
additional technical data on staffing and finances17. Drawing upon this first national 
review of all 39 LEPs across England, this report presents analysis of their strategies 
and priorities, organisation and governance, resources, effectiveness and working 
relations, innovations, lessons learned, capacity building issues, future barriers and 
challenges. 
 
Although diversity and variety across a range of dimensions is marked amongst the 39 
LEPs, their role and contribution is being compromised by a fragmented and shifting 
landscape of economic development governance and the absence of a longer-term 
vision and plan for their development. Concerns are being generated by unresolved 
tensions between centralism and localism, competition and collaboration, agility and 
‘bureaucratisation’, and whether or not the ‘LEP Family’ develops a more coherent 
collective voice and begins to articulate its interests with Central Government. These 
issues are being exacerbated by the existence of differential and overlapping 
approaches to functional economic geographies within the ‘LEP Family’. Given the 
lack of initial long-term vision and strategy for their development, the fundamental 
tensions yet to be resolved and their institutional deficits and limitations in authority, 
accountability, capability and resources, at this stage in their evolution, the findings 
suggest that many LEPs will struggle to exercise substantive influence upon economic 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Bentley, G.,Bailey, D. and Shutt, J. (2010) “From RDAs to LEPs: A New Localism? Case examples 
from West Midlands and Yorkshire”,Local Economy, 25, 7, 535-557. 
16 Including, for example, DBIS (2010) Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential, London, DBIS; Odgers 
Berndtson (2012) LEPs: A Chairs Perspective, London, Odgers Berndtson; Walker (2013) Local Authorities, Local 
Enterprise Partnerships and the Growth Agenda, First Report of Joint Research Project, CEDOS and ADEPT, Dorset. 
17 We would like to acknowledge the input into the design of the survey instrument of Jane Hall, (DBIS), Ben Stoneman 
(DCLG) and Lorna Gibbons (The LEP Network). 
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growth at the local level. Continued state austerity, chronic low growth and brittle and 
uncertain economic conditions in the short and medium-term will further trouble this 
central task. 
 
2. Institutions and local economic development 
Examination of the particular case of the LEPs in England sits within a broader strand 
of international research focused upon the role of institutions in the promotion or 
hindrance of economic growth18. Arguments that institutions are necessarily distortions 
and bureaucratic hindrances to the free and fair operation of the market economy have 
been questioned19. Similarly, the case for institutions as a kind of ‘magic dust’ capable 
delivering successful economic growth and development in any circumstances has 
been challenged20. As a consequence, institutions have received growing recognition of 
their role and importance in the economy. Helpman21 even concludes that: 
 
institutions affect the incentives to reorganize production and distribution in 
order to exploit new opportunities, and the incentives to accumulate physical 
and human capital. For these reasons institutions are more fundamental 
determinants of economic growth than R&D or capital accumulation, human or 
physical. 
 
International research has sought to address the lack of clarity and precision in exactly 
what institutions are and how, why and where institutions foster or inhibit particular 
kinds and degrees of economic growth and development in different settings. The 
research has distinguished between formal or ‘hard’ institutions such as laws and 
organisations and informal or ‘soft’ institutions such as culture and tradition as well as 
the institutional environment or context and the institutional arrangements or actually 
                                                 
18 Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2010) Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development? Working Papers 2010-02, Instituto 
Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales, http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2010-02.pdf; 
Farole, T., Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Storper, M. (2010) “Human geography and the institutions that underlie economic 
growth”, Progress in Human Geography, 35, 1, 58-80.  
19 Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2008) The role of institutions in growth and development, Working Paper 10. 
Commission on Growth and Development, The World Bank: Washington, DC. 
20 Tomaney, J. (2013) “Regions and the ‘institutional turn’”, Progress in Human Geography 
21 Helpman, E (2004: 139) The Mystery of Economic Growth, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
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existing organisations and rules22. Often focusing on different institutional 
arrangements at the national level23, studies have sought to discern how such 
institutions interact and work in a range of ways: diagnosing and interpreting economic 
growth issues; leading and decision-making; articulating courses of action and paths of 
development; facilitating dialogue and negotiation; formulating strategy and priorities; 
providing voice in multi-level and multi-actor systems of government and governance; 
co-ordinating, integrating and mobilising actors; fostering linkages between public, 
private and civic sectors; generating, pooling and directing resources; and, setting the 
framework and incentives that shape the individual and collective choices and 
behaviours of economic actors24.  
 
In sum, this work is trying to understand, explain and analyse evidence of the ways in 
which institutions provide and support the connections and relationships between 
multiple actors in the public, private and civic sectors working at different levels – 
from the supranational, national, regional, local and urban – to design, develop and 
deliver effective public policy in support of economic growth. 
 
In policy circles too, institutions are receiving greater attention given their role in 
supporting and nurturing economic growth and development at a range of scales. 
Indeed, the role of institutions in diagnosing and managing local and regional context 
is central to the debate between place-based and spatially-blind approaches to 
economic development policy25. Organisations such as the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) claim that for economic growth: 
 
                                                 
22 Martin, R. (2000) “Institutional Approaches to Economic Geography” in T. Barnes and E. Sheppard (Eds.) A 
Companion to Economic Geography, Blackwell: Oxford, 77-94. 
23 Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Profile Books: 
London. 
24 Gertler, M. (2010) “Rules of the game: the place of institutions in regional economic change”, Regional Studies, 44, 1, 
1-15; Rodrik, D. (2003) “Introduction” in D. Rodrik (Ed.) In Search of Prosperity, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 
NJ.  
25 Barca, F; McCann, P and Rodríguez-Pose, A (2012) “The case for regional development intervention: place-based 
versus place-neutral approaches”, Journal of Regional Science, 52, 1, 134-152; World Bank (2009) Reshaping Economic 
Geography, The World Bank: Washington, DC. 
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Institutional factors are also critical. Formal and informal institutions that 
facilitate negotiation and dialogue among key actors in order to mobilise and 
integrate them into the development process are vital, as are those that enhance 
policy continuity. At times, the challenge is to create institutions that strengthen 
the region’s ‘voice’ in dealing with other regions and countries and those that 
foster linkages among the private, public and education sectors26. 
 
Focusing upon the ways in which some regions get trapped in low growth trajectories, 
OECD highlight in their explanation the importance of ‘institutional bottlenecks’. 
These include poor mobilisation of stakeholders, lack of continuity and coherence in 
the implementation of policies by institutions, institutional instability, lack of a 
common and strategic vision, and lack of capacity and gaps in multi-level governance 
frameworks. Addressing the relative gap in understanding and empirical analysis at the 
local level, this study of the empirical experience of the LEPs in England draws upon 
and is informed by these wider currents in understanding the role of institutions in 
economic growth. 
 
3. Strategies and priorities 
A critical element of the role of institutions in local economic growth is in leading in 
devising and formulating strategy and deciding upon priorities in concert with relevant 
actors from the public, private and civic spheres. Diversity and variety in the economic 
conditions and potential within the LEPs have been critical in shaping their strategy-
setting and prioritising activities. As Figure 2 illustrates, there are wide differences 
between the LEP areas in their economic performance based on GVA per head. Better 
performing LEP areas have therefore had to address questions about the qualitative 
nature of growth – for example which economic activities and sectors are targeted and 
how growth can be sustained and infrastructure provided – while poorer performing 
LEP areas have had to confront different issues about putting in place the conditions 
for growth – for example in assembling land, premises, infrastructure and skills. 
                                                 
26 OECD (2012: 25) Promoting Growth in All Regions, OECD: Paris. 
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Figure 2: GVA per head by LEP area, 2011 
 
Source: ONS and The LEP Network Annual Review of LEP Economies 2013 
 
Broadly, four different types of strategy were discernible, although several constituted 
mixed hybrids, and were shaped by the particular genesis and character of the LEP. 
The types of strategies comprised those: i) focused on the LEP area as an economic 
geography; ii) focused on the LEP as an institution; iii) based on rolling forward an 
already existing strategy; and, iv) the product of a new formulation exercise. Around 
half of the LEPs inherited their strategy – either implicitly or explicitly and to a greater 
or lesser degree – from previous area-based economic strategies framed by a RDA sub-
regional partnership or local authority Local Economic Assessment. In this case, the 
strategy and priorities tended to be put to and discussed with LEP boards prior to 
adoption. Where new strategies have been developed and approved these tended to be 
commissioned as part of an external consultant-led process, or in some cases ‘pulled 
together’ by an executive, with board deliberations using specific workshops. 
Significantly, in the context of Government’s ‘What Works’ agenda27, use of evidence 
bases, formulation and consultation has been inconsistent. Although a substantive 
group of LEPs were active in engaging key local actors in developing and ‘owning’ 
local strategies and priorities. The changed and new geographies of many LEP areas 
                                                 
27 Cabinet Office (2013) What Works: Evidence Centres for Social Policy, Cabinet Office: London. 
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have reduced the value of existing investments in evidence base development especially 
by the RDAs, either creating a gap in evidence for the LEP to confront or more often 
forcing the LEPs into using scarce resources to commission new studies relevant to 
their new geographies and changing contexts.  
 
The other key difference in the character of strategies and priorities is whether they 
were about the area or about the LEP’s contribution to an area – the latter being more 
akin to a business strategy for an organisation or corporate plan. In general, where the 
LEP is intended to be an instrument of the local authorities (again either explicitly or 
implicitly), the strategy and priorities have been about defining how the LEP can ‘add 
value’ within existing arrangements. The LEP-based business plan approach spans 
both seemingly well-resourced LEPs in, for instance, some core city regions, and much 
more streamlined, often county-based LEPs. 
 
In terms of strategic prioritisation, LEPs have either adopted a sector-focus at a range 
of levels (e.g. food processing, advanced manufacturing, renewables), a thematic focus 
(e.g. skills, inward investment, infrastructure, connectivity), or a mix of both. Until the 
announcements in the CSR 2013, very few LEPs were focused upon housing despite 
the Government’s emphasis in this area as a means of kick-starting growth.28 When the 
strategy has been explicitly about the LEP organisation itself, there has been greater 
prominence given to the identification of prominent LEP activities (e.g. Enterprise 
Zones) or support for specific projects, and some differentiation between modes of 
LEP role, for example business voice, programme commissioner and/or fixer and 
honest broker. Priorities have been articulated in different ways by the LEPs with 
some aggregation into programmes and some split into discrete projects.  
 
In contrast to the era of the RDAs29, there has been no common performance 
management framework for the LEPs. Central Government explicitly did not set 
specific targets or yardsticks against which LEP activity and performance would be 
                                                 
28 The Local Growth Fund will draw one-fifth of its resources from DCLG’s New Homes Bonus funding stream.  
29 Pike, A., Coombes, M., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2012) The Case for the Abolition of RDAs in England: An 
Assessment, Unpublished Paper, CURDS, Newcastle University: Newcastle Upon Tyne.  
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assessed and judged. Although with the introduction of Strategic Economic Plans, the 
advent of the Local Growth Fund and the prospect of ‘Growth Deals’, the LEPs have 
started to examine how to improve the transparency and accountability of LEP 
decision-making.30 The picture to date has been mixed across the 39 LEPs with a 
handful having a performance management framework, several having published 
annual progress reviews and others identifying measures of success and progress in 
programme and project deliverables and outcomes. The BIS Select Committee called 
for measurable indicators of performance of LEP activity in forms understandable by 
local communities to enable accountability, monitoring and scrutiny of the use and 
value of public resources by the LEPs31. Evaluation and monitoring arrangements are 
currently work in progress, with the Government looking to actively work closer with 
LEPs as part of the Growth Deal process. The issue of accountability is increasingly 
being recognised as a vital issue by LEPs in demonstrating worth and contribution to 
local and national economic growth, especially in the wake of the Heseltine Review, 
Strategic Economic Plans and the Local Growth Fund. At the same time, it is 
important to distinguish between narrow financial accountability for spending public 
money and questions of the broader accountability of LEPs in the sense of 
transparency, accountability and public scrutiny. All LEPs are ‘refreshing’ their initial 
strategic and prioritisation exercises to meet the new challenges being set by 
Government. It will be important to consider how prescriptive the process is, for the 
implementation of recent Government guidance, in the preparation of new ‘Strategic 
Economic Plans’.32  
 
4. Organisation and governance 
How institutions are organised and governed is integral to their capability and potential 
role and contribution to local economic growth. In common with strategy and 
priorities, whilst there is no single or universal LEP model of organisation and 
                                                 
30 For example, the LEP Network has held workshops for LEPs to examine the issue of LEP ‘Governance’.  
31 House of Commons and Business, Innovation and Skills Committee (2013) Local Enterprise Partnerships, Ninth 
Report of Session 2012–13, HC598, The Stationery Office: London. 
32 In the context of the Local Growth Fund, the Government has asked that LEPs prepare bids to the Fund on the basis 
of robust evidence-based ‘Strategic Economic Plans’, which will be negotiated as ‘Growth Deals’. Guidance on Strategic 
Economic Plans and Growth Deals was published by Government in July 2013. 
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governance, there are not 39 different models. In the evolving context, all LEPs are 
reviewing second – or in a small number of cases third – generation arrangements in 
the light of the government’s response to Heseltine and CSR 2013. Different legal 
forms are being utilised across the LEPs that fall into three categories: incorporation 
with single (e.g. Local Authority) or multiple shareholders; unincorporated voluntary 
partnerships; and, part of broader Local Authority or City-Region/Mayoral strategic 
governance arrangements (e.g. Combined Authority, Greater London 
Authority/Mayor). Indeed, the LEPs in Manchester and London are especially 
embedded within the existing governance arrangements. The LEP in the latter is 
termed the ‘Local Enterprise Panel’ rather than ‘Partnership’. Almost all LEPs have 
either a single or set of multiple LAs as the ‘Accountable Body’ for the stewardship of 
public money. The modi operandi of the LEPs was evident through a range of 
organisational structures and practices: LA Leaders Boards; Board leads (public and 
private); Standing sub-groups; ‘Task and Finish’ groups; Delivery Partners; and, 
Business Membership body support arrangements. 
 
The role and status of the Chair is crucial for the character and focus of the LEP. The 
quality of the leadership provided is seen as fundamental to defining what the LEP is 
about and articulating its strategy and priorities. Some areas have sought a high profile 
‘name’ to represent the LEP externally, and particularly to attract ‘big hitters’ amongst 
potential local partners and to unlock doors with Government. Others have secured a 
‘convenor’ of the board and consensus-builder for local inter and intra-public-business 
relations. There is also a major division in terms of the time commitment expected. 
Most Chairs have made a significant commitment to their role but this obviously varies 
depending on, for instance, how demanding their ‘day jobs’ are, whether they are in 
major substantive business roles (e.g. a Chair or CEO) or whether they are pursuing a 
portfolio career post-formal ‘retirement’. 
 
The size of the LEP Boards varies from over forty in the case of the South East LEP 
to under ten in Worcestershire (Figure 3). Although the Government has set out a 
‘requirement’ for at least 50% of LEP Boards to be drawn from the private sector, the 
 12
distribution of public and private representatives on the LEP Boards varies 
geographically too.33 For example, in the Northamptonshire LEP 73% of the Board is 
from the private sector, whilst in the West of England LEP 60% of the Board is from 
the public sector.34 It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Boards provide 
some – at least indirect – representativeness for the populations within their areas. A 
crude measure of Board representatives per capita for the LEPs ranges from over 
1:700,000 in London and 1:200,000 in D2N2 and Greater Manchester to under 
1:50,000 in over a quarter of LEPs (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3: Board size and membership by LEP area, 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ survey 
 
  
                                                 
33 No formal guidance was issued to local areas in advance of preparing bids to Government to establish LEPs. However, 
the Government did indicate, during negotiations over the formation of individual LEPs, that they would like LEP 
Boards to reflect a broad array of the local business base. Indeed, in some cases, LEPs recruited their Boards on the basis 
of having a spread of experience and expertise from different industries and sectors. 
34 The Government has formally-recognised LEP Boards that meet their requirements of at least 50% private sector 
membership, and have a private sector Chair. The Government has also encouraged LEP Boards to be more diverse and 
reflect the make-up of their local populations.  
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Figure 4: Population per Board Member by LEP area  
 
Source: Authors’ survey and ONS data 
 
As Peter Walker rightly acknowledges35, the relationship between the LEP and its 
constituent local authorities is critical. There is a range of emergent types that can be 
discerned. First, there are LEPs that are explicitly a sub-set of mayoral and combined 
authority governance arrangements, for example in London and Greater Manchester. 
With the North East, Leeds, Sheffield and Liverpool planning to have Combined 
Authorities in place by April 2014, representing 6 LEP areas and 15% of LEPs. Where 
the new entity of the LEP is absorbed into existing structures it is deemed to have 
greater accountability and legitimacy. Second, a number of LEPs are operating as de 
facto business-led arms-length or ‘daughter’ organisations of the local authority Leaders’ 
Board (approximately 13 and 33% of the total). Last, is a group of LEPs that are still 
‘finding their way’ and are currently sitting alongside often newly-formed LA 
leadership structures (20 and 52% of the total). Given the upcoming changes and 
encouragement of the Combined Authority as Central Government’s preferred form 
of sub-national governance in England, how LEPs relate to the emergent and changing 
structures will be critical to their role and capacity in shaping local economic growth.  
                                                 
35 Walker, P. (2013) Local Authorities, Local Enterprise Partnerships and the Growth Agenda, First Report of Joint 
Research Project, CEDOS and ADEPT: Dorset. 
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As business-led organisations, the relationship between the LEPs and local businesses 
and business representative organisations is similarly important to the LEP-local 
authorities’ relationship. The relations are evolving amongst the LEPs, shaped by their 
particular genesis. In some LEPs, the Chamber of Commerce has played an integral 
role, and in specific cases is even providing the LEP Secretariat.36 Elsewhere, as some 
LEPs seek to enrol businesses as subscribing members, this potentially puts them into 
competition with business representative organisations. Some LEPs explicitly claim to 
be the local ‘business voice’ whilst most claim to be either ‘a’ voice for business or a 
mediator of business voices. 
 
Three years in, then, organisation and governance are unsettled and are set to change 
significantly over the coming 12-24 months. Beyond the formal differentiators outlined 
above (i.e. legal form, chair, board size and composition, local authority and business 
relations), there exists real unease over accountabilities and culture. On accountability, 
the central question is: to whom is the LEP really accountable? The survey findings 
reveal tensions between an array of possibilities: genuinely not knowing; accountability 
to a Local Authority Leaders’ Board (or, in London, the Mayor); accountability to 
‘business’ (however defined); and, accountability to Central Government and the 
Secretaries of State in DBIS and/or DCLG. A fundamental question lurks within the 
issue of accountability: What is the LEP? Is it the Board? Is it the organisations 
represented on the Board? Is it a loose local coalition of public, private and third sector 
players with contributions to make to local growth? And, does Government have 
specific normative expectations of what a LEP should be in order to assume the level of 
responsibilities earmarked for LEPs that were announced in the Autumn Statement 
and subsequently Budget 2013 and CSR 2013? The current conjuncture is a long way 
from the voluntary ‘invitation’ set out in the June 2010 letter from the Secretaries of 
State at DBIS and DCLG. 
 
 
                                                 
36 For example, the Cumbria LEP and Cumbria Chamber of Commerce and Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire LEP and Chamber of Commerce (D2N2).  
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On culture, the major concern for LEPs is how to retain their agility, flexibility and 
entrepreneurialism in the face of the creeping ‘bureaucratisation’ arising from the 
widening array and increasing level of responsibilities and resources envisaged for the 
LEPs.37 Amongst others and depending upon particular circumstances, the LEPs are 
now in a position of trying to build capability to deal with EU Structural and 
Investment Funds, Strategic Economic Plans and funding bids, EZs, GPF, RGF, City 
Deals (where appropriate) and the Local Growth Fund. Interestingly, this expansion in 
the role and responsibilities of the LEPs echoes the ‘mission creep’ of unintentional 
expansion beyond their original goals experienced by the RDAs38. 
 
In practical organisational terms, unevenness is evident in the speed at which the LEPs 
have been established and got up and running. LEPs building up and adapting existing 
(sub)regional partnerships were understandably quicker off the mark. As new 
institutions in an emergent and evolving context, each LEP has had to travel down the 
road of organisational development: staffing, structures, identity and brand, premises, 
etc. (Figure 5). Indeed, external relations and raising awareness of the LEP and its aim, 
purpose and strategy was seen as a key ambition for each LEP in its area but one that 
was under-developed given the need for prioritisation and focus in other areas. The 
need to establish what the LEP was for and how it was planning to add value amongst 
the public, private and civic actors in the LEP area was and remains a fundamental 
task.  
  
                                                 
37 Addressing The LEP Network Annual Conference in April 2013 Lord Heseltine, commenting on the future 
responsibilities and roles of LEPs – in contrast to the original vision for the Partnerships - said: “As a LEP Chair is it 
really what you want to do? If you have any doubts, no hard feelings, now is the time to go. Is your organisation up for it? 
Do you have the right capacity and staff? If the answer is no then address the issue now.” 
38 Pike, A., Coombes, M., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2012) The Case for the Abolition of RDAs in England: An 
Assessment, Unpublished Paper, CURDS, Newcastle University: Newcastle Upon Tyne. 
 Figure 5
Source: LE
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conditionalities on how and on what it can be spent or whether it is in-kind support 
from a seconded individual or time from another organisation. Third, there is the issue 
of measuring the value of the pro-bono publico and voluntary contributions made to the 
LEPs, for example by the Chair, Board members and other institutions such as 
universities, further education colleges, civic groups and the private sector. 
 
In allocating resources to the LEPs, Central Government is using a range of different 
approaches and mechanisms. First, there is ‘core-uniform’ allocation of amounts to 
each LEP – awarded by DBIS – for meeting operational costs and preparing strategies.  
The LEP Capacity Fund has had two rounds totalling £4m, whilst the LEP Start-Up 
Fund provided £5m in total to LEPs on the basis of competitive bids and match-
funding. More recently, the LEPs shared a further £5m for executive support and will 
receive, subject to match funding, an additional sum of £250,000 each in 2013/14 and 
2014/15. There has also been £500,000 worth of skills funding given to Wave 1 City 
Deals and some additional skills resource given to LEPs that were not partners in 
Wave 1 City Deals but did have designated Enterprise Zones. Given the diversity and 
variety of the LEPs, especially in terms of their size and capability, it might be 
questioned whether disbursing equal amounts is the most appropriate allocation 
mechanism.  
 
Second, there is ‘core-varied’ allocation where specified formulae have been used and 
each LEP gets a different amount of funding. The Growing Places Fund (GPF), for 
example, was allocated on a formula based on population density and employed 
earnings (employment multiplied by earnings).39 In addition, funding for Local 
Transport Bodies (reflecting LEP geographies) – and which will be a major component 
of the Local Growth Fund – has been allocated on the basis of population.40 Analysing 
the geographical distribution of the GPF demonstrates that some of the LEP areas 
with the strongest economic performance received relatively more of the public 
funding under this initiative (Figure 6). This particular type of allocation mechanism 
                                                 
39 DfT/DCLG (2011) Growing Places Fund Prospectus, Department for Transport/Department for Communities and 
Local Government: London. 
40 DfT (2013) Devolution of Funding for Local Major Transport Schemes, Department for Transport: London. 
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was an innovation in spatial policy terms in rejecting any compensatory or 
redistributive principle of moving public resources from richer to poorer areas and, in 
the context of recession and chronic low growth in the UK41, seeking to focus on areas 
with the greatest potential for immediate economic growth in an example of “helping 
the strongest first”42. 
 
Figure 6: GPF allocations by GVA per capita of LEP area, 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CLG data. 
 
Third, there is ‘competitive-general’ allocation where the funds from specific initiatives 
are only allocated to specific LEPs through a competitive bidding mechanism. The 
amounts allocated will vary but the LEP has a degree of flexibility in how the funds are 
allocated within the framework of the initiative. In this mode, 11 of the 25 new 
generation Enterprise Zones (EZs), for example, were allocated on the basis of bids 
from LEP areas.43 The competitive allocation mechanism aims to encourage 
innovation, stimulate creative ideas and reward the best bids. The results create 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in a geographically uneven map of public resource allocation. Of 
                                                 
41Compared to the GPF, the intention of the Regional Growth Fund has been to help areas and communities at risk of 
being affected by public sector job cuts.   
42 The Economist (2011) “Bagehot”, The Economist, 26 November, The Economist: London. 
 
43 DCLG (2011) Enterprise Zone Prospectus, Department for Communities and Local Government: London. The 25th 
Enterprise Zone is a further Liverpool EZ coming through the Liverpool City Deal.  
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the 39 LEPs, 11 (28%) were awarded a ‘first wave’ EZ without any formal 
competition, 26 (67%) bids were submitted for a ‘second wave’ EZ, and 13 (50%) were 
successful.44 The map of EZs across ‘LEP-land’ displays a geographically dispersed 
pattern. The ‘first wave’ of EZs was, in the main, awarded to LEPs in the north and 
the midlands, whilst the ‘second wave’ of EZs was awarded predominantly to LEPs in 
the south. This reflected a desire on the part of Government to ‘spread the 
opportunities around the country’ and should also be seen in the context of criticism at 
the time about the particular geographical allocation of ‘first wave EZs’. This map in 
turn has uneven implications for the resources available to LEPs in terms of potential 
revenue streams of receipts, although it is difficult to tell whether or not this stream of 
long-term funding for LEPs has been based on assumptions and forecasts that may 
turn out to be unfulfilled45. 
 
Last, there is ‘competitive-specific’ allocation using a competitive bidding mechanism. 
The amounts will again vary by LEP but the funding has tighter conditions set for its 
specific use. The Regional Growth Fund (RGF), for example, is allocated on this basis. 
It has created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ with some LEPs being unsuccessful in bids and 
some LEPs deciding not to bid often due to capacity concerns. Although not restricted 
to LEPs, the geographical distribution of RGF demonstrates a slant towards poorer 
economically performing regions and LEP areas, and those places with higher public 
sector employment (Figure 7 and Table 1).46 Significantly, the competitive principle 
was signalled as the preferred mechanism for resource allocation in the Heseltine 
Review and the subsequent Local Growth Fund.  
  
                                                 
44 SQW (2011) Enterprise Zones: Delivering the Plan for Growth? SQW: Cambridge. 
45 The estimates of EZ receipts, which all LEPs had to submit to Government – and are derived from projected business 
rate growth – were requested from DCLG but were not made available for this study.  
46BIS (2013) RGF Annual Monitoring Report, London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
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Figure 7: RGF (£) Awarded to LEPs (Rounds 1-3) by Per Capita47 
 
Source: BIS data and Authors’ own estimates.  
 
Table 1: Value of RGF Approved Bids by Region (£m) in Rounds 1 - 3 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Total 
North East 62 100 133 333
North West 28 212 142 382
West Midlands 107 123 194 427
East Midlands 7 72 38 117
Yorks & 
Humber 
45 118 101 264
East, South East 
& London 
13 105 104 222
South West 8 91 90 189
Nationwide 175 90 225 485
Totals 445 911 1027 2419
Source: BIS 
 
  
                                                 
47 Analysis of BIS data on RGF Bids awarded to LEPs in Rounds 1-3. 
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In generating and pooling resources within the LEPs, a range of different forms is 
evident. Some of which are difficult to value in pure financial terms. First, LEPs have 
drawn upon financial contributions from their constituent local authorities. These have 
often come with conditions imposed on their use. Second, LEPs have received 
contributions from private sector business within their areas, either through a 
subscription and/or membership-type model. Third, beyond direct financial 
contributions, secondments of staff from partners to work with LEPs have been 
widely used, involving staff from local authorities and other public agencies as well as 
Chambers of Commerce. Fourth, in-kind support has been provided by partners – 
such as further and higher education – for some LEPs. This has included premises and 
office administration support. Last, contributions have been made on a pro-bono publico 
basis, for example from further and/or higher education institutions, and through 
volunteering by public, private and civic actors. Significantly, in the context of the 
“austerity state”48, the ‘self-help’ and internal generation of resources by and for the 
LEPs is at least one clear element of Central Government’s longer term vision, aligning 
with international aspirations toward the self-financing of local and regional economic 
development institutions49.  
 
Given the complexities and difficulties involved in identifying the different forms of 
allocation from Central Government and the generation of resources by the LEPs, the 
analysis here can only provide a partial picture of the estimated financial resources at 
the disposal of a sub-set of the 39 LEPs.50 The relatively better endowed LEPs have 
access to EZ, RGF and other programme funding, some independent sources of local 
revenue in addition to Government core funding streams and GPF allocations. In sum, 
the combination of Central Government allocations and internally generated sources 
can amount to an estimated footprint of well over £10m per annum for the next 3 
years for the better-resourced LEPs. Less well-endowed LEPs are restricted effectively 
                                                 
48 Schäfer, A. and Streeck, W. (2013) “Introduction: politics in the age of austerity” in A. Schäfer 
 and W. Streeck (Eds.) Politics in the Age of Austerity, Polity: Cambridge. 
49 Bellini, N., Danson, M. and Halkier, H. (2012) “RDA futures?” in N. Bellini, M. Danson and H. Halkier (2012) (Eds.) 
Regional Development Agencies: The Next Generation?, Routledge: Abingdon, 307-311.  
50 Not all LEPs have been able to provide a breakdown of the financial resources at their disposal. In particular, it is more 
problematic to identify ‘revenue’ resources available to fund LEP executive operations.  
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to Government core (including earlier Capacity Building and Start-up) and GPF 
sources. This analysis demonstrates the level of resources LEPs appear to have 
available to allocate themselves or ‘influence’ on the basis of their Growth and 
European Funding Strategies with the geographical distribution tilted toward the 
economically weaker LEP areas and core city regions (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Combined GPF, RGF and EU Structural & Investment Fund 
Resources under the ‘Strategic Influence’ of LEPs in £m (2011-2020/21)51 
 
Source: HMG figures and Authors’ own estimates 
  
                                                 
51 Figures for RGF are based on estimates of the allocations in Rounds 1-3. EU Structural and Investment Fund 
allocations have been published in € and have been converted to £ using the exchange rate of 0.8627 as of 15 July 2013. 
Up to 2% of GPF funding can be spent on programme management, which is envisaged to support LEP and partner 
capacity.  
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The nature of the funding, however, means that even the better-endowed LEPs face 
complications. The character of funding is not always clear-cut. There are considerable 
and variable in-kind contributions – especially from the private sector and/or board 
members – and institutional ownership issues where either accountable body 
arrangements are directive or the LEP merely acts as a gateway or post-box to a 
delivery organisation. Where the core funding is modest and the competitive funding is 
effectively ring fenced by specific conditions, LEPs risk focusing all their effort on the 
funded programmes because the core funding does not provide sufficient capacity to 
develop either strategic or institutional capacity and the capabilities to do much else. In 
assessing and considering the strategic deployment of financial resources amongst the 
LEPs, the issues are nuanced. LEPs may appear prima facie to have relatively substantial 
levels of funding but if it is all earmarked for national and/or EU programmes then 
this may hamper its strategic influence and institutional resilience. A number of LEP 
archetypes can therefore be identified distinguished by the levels and types of core and 
programme funding (Table 2). Such distinctions are important in addressing future 
challenges for LEP resources relating to the ‘Single Funding Pot’ of the Local Growth 
Fund, how local partners ‘match’ funding from government, the leadership and 
management of EU programmes, and how technical assistance and allowed 
‘overhead’/administration charges for programmes are utilised. 
 
Table 2: LEP Archetypes by Financial Source 
Enhanced, high levels of un-
ringfenced core funding 
Strategic influencer Strategic leadership of local 
economic institutional 
landscape 
Basic Government core
funding 
“LEP-lite” – one of a number 
of players in local economic 
landscape 
Programme/project ‘factory’ –
needing to deliver prescribed 
specifics just to keep afloat 
 
 
LOW amounts and/or 
multiple small programmes 
HIGH amounts and/or large 
programmes 
Source: Authors’ research 
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In terms of the key resource of people, taken at face value some LEPs, at the time of 
the survey in early 2013, claimed to have up to 60 direct staff (e.g. Liverpool City 
Region), and around one third of LEPs have 5-9 staff and a further third 1-4 staff 
(Figure 9).52 A key distinction here is between staff directly employed and at the 
disposal and direction of the LEP and those staff that effectively wear ‘two-hats’ in 
working for a LEP and a Leader’s Board and/or pre-existing partnership arrangement. 
In these circumstances the resources and capacity available to LEPs and/or to other 
partnerships and organisations becomes blurred. The management and co-ordination 
of the interests of the various institutions involved therefore becomes an issue.  
 
Figure 9: Estimated Number of Direct Staff by LEP Area, 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ survey 
 
                                                 
52 For the survey, not every LEP provided information on the exact number of direct and indirect staff working on behalf 
of the LEP. 
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As the agenda has developed in the direction of increasing the funding and 
responsibilities for the LEPs, as set out in the 2013 Budget and CSR 2013, there are 
several fundamental issues on resourcing the LEPs. First, the pace of change has been 
rapid since 2010: moving from start-up, embryonic organisations to bidders and 
delivery managers for the Local Growth Fund and EU programmes in little over three 
years (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Timeline of the evolution of the LEPs 
Dates Events
11 May 2010 The Coalition Government is formed. The 
Coalition Agreement sets out the intention of 
the Government to support the creation of 
‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs). 
22 June 2010 The Emergency Budget announces the 
abolition of the 8 Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) in England. 
29 June 2010 A joint letter from Eric Pickles and Vince 
Cable invites Local Authorities and Business 
Leaders to submit proposals to form LEPs. 
29 June 2010 Nick Clegg launches the Regional Growth 
Fund (RGF). 
6 September 2010 The Government announces that 57 proposals 
have been received from local areas to form 
LEPs.  
28 October 2010 The Government confirms that 24 proposals 
to form LEPs have been agreed. 33 proposals 
have either been rejected or local areas have 
been asked to submit revised proposals.53 In 
the end, 39 LEPs were formed.  
28 October 2010 The Local Growth White Paper sets out the 
                                                 
53 The LEP proposals ‘rejected’ by the Government in October 2010 were: Bexley, Dartford and Gravesham; Blackpool 
and Fylde Coast; Coastal West Sussex; County Durham; Cross Roads of England; Devon, Plymouth and Torbay; East 
Anglia; East Sussex; Gatwick Diamond; Gloucester, Swindon and Wiltshire; Hampshire; Hull, East Riding and 
Scarborough; Kent-Essex; Kent and Medway; Newcastle-Gateshead; Northumberland and North Tyneside; Pennine 
Lancashire; South Somerset and East Devon; South Tyneside and Sunderland; Surrey Connects; Stoke on Trent and 
Staffordshire; Visitor Economy Southern England; and West Midlands. 
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Dates Events
roles for LEPs depending on local priorities.
9 December 2010 BIS Select Committee publishes the report: 
‘The New Local Enterprise Partnerships: An 
Initial Assessment’.  
21 January 2011 RGF Round 1 closes. 
15 March 2011 The LEP Network is formed – with the British 
Chambers of Commerce – in receipt of DCLG 
funding – providing the Network’s secretariat. 
23 March 2011 In the Budget it is announced that 11 
Enterprise Zones (EZs) will be designated to 
LEPs. A competitive process will take place for 
a further 10 EZs to be awarded to interested 
LEPs.  
1 April 2011 The Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
comes into formal existence.  
30 June 2011 Deadline for proposals from LEPs seeking to 
secure a ‘Second Wave’ EZ. 
1 July 2011 RGF Round 2 closes. 
4 July 2011 The Government receives 29 proposals from 
LEPs bidding for a ‘Second Wave’ EZ. 
15 August 2011 The Government agrees 11 ‘Second Wave’ 
EZs. 
3 October 2011 Government announces two EZs (Humber 
and Lancashire) are to be created in response 
to redundancies announced by BAe Systems. 
7 November 2011 The Government launches the Growing Places 
Fund (GPF) for LEPs. 
16 November 2011 Localism Bill 2011 receives Royal Assent and 
becomes the 2011 Localism Act. 
January 2012 The Government launches a consultation on 
the formation of Local Transport Boards. 
31 March 2012 RDAs operationally closed. They would be 
dissolved as legal entities on 1 July 2012.   
1 April 2012 All 24 Enterprise Zones ‘go live’. 
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Dates Events
13 June 2012 RGF Round 3 closes.
18 September 2012 The first 8 City Deals are ‘formalised’ with the 
Government. 
29 October 2012 The ‘competition’ for a Second Wave of City 
Deals is launched.  
31 October 2012 Lord Heseltine’s ‘No Stone Unturned’ report is 
published.  
23 January 2013 The Government publishes indicative funding 
allocations to Local Transport Boards. 
19 February 2013 20 Second Wave City Deals are invited by the 
Deputy Prime Minister to negotiate final deals. 
18 March 2013 The Government’s response to Lord 
Heseltine’s report is published, which includes 
its support for the creation of the Local 
Growth Fund.  
20 March 2013 RGF Round 4 closes.
15 April 2013 DBIS publishes preliminary guidance for LEPs 
on the Development of EU Structural and 
Investment Fund Strategies.  
26 April 2013 BIS Select Committee publishes its 9th Report 
of Session 2012-13 – ‘Local Enterprise 
Partnerships’. 
10 June 2013 13 EZs shortlisted to receive funding from the 
£100m Local Infrastructure Fund.  
25 June 2013 Press reports indicate that the LEPs Chairs 
have formed an alternative group (‘The 39 
LEPs’) to the LEP Network. 
26 June 2013 At the Comprehensive Spending Review 2013,
the Chancellor announces the size of the Local 
Growth Fund (£2bn per annum). 
27 June 2013 The Government publishes ‘Investing in 
Britain’, which sets out further detail on the 
Local Growth Fund and other funding streams 
available to LEPs. 
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Dates Events
27 June 2013 DBIS publishes indicative allocations (to 
LEPs) of €6.2bn European Union Strategic 
Investment Funds (2014-2020). 
11 July 2013 
 
RGF Round 4 successful bidders announced 
and AMR on RGF Rounds 1 and 2 published. 
Source: Authors’ research 
 
Concerns are evident amongst LEPs that this seemingly unplanned and rapid pace of 
development has precluded their organic growth and evolution as institutions. Second, 
the accountability and transparency of the LEPs in their handling of increasing 
amounts of public funding is unresolved – as the BIS Select Committee recognised. 
How can LEPs demonstrate the appropriate stewardship of resources? Will LEPs 
require sophisticated resource, delivery and performance management arrangements at 
scale and levels of transparency that means they will have to ‘run before they have 
learned to walk?’ The required administration of funding will require substantive 
investments in the organisational capacity of LEPs just to manage the funds. Devising 
innovative and flexible ways of integrating and pooling funds will require yet more 
resource and time. Such issues will need further clarification as Government core 
funding and local match requirements commence (effectively from April 2013). 
 
6. Effectiveness and working relations 
The way in which specific institutions inter-relate and work with multiple actors within 
wider institutional arrangements stretching across the supranational, national, regional 
and local levels are centrally important to their influence upon economic growth at the 
local scale. Given their relatively limited resources and insertion into a fragmented and 
evolving landscape of economic development governance, working relationships with 
relevant partners in the public, private and civic sectors have been critical to LEP 
effectiveness. One LEP described this as “partnership capital” (Authors’ Interview, 
2013). Most if not all LEPs were focused upon trying to interpret the shifting 
landscape and identifying where they could genuinely add value through their activities, 
especially in providing the lead and mobilising actors.  
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In local-central relations, many LEPs welcomed the direct connections to Central 
Government departments and officials. Numerous LEPs found it more effective rather 
than having to engage with a regional tier of institutions.  Whether it is considered 
effective for Central Government civil servants to be dealing with the demands of 39 
LEPs is another question. That said, some LEPs were becoming well connected and 
forming substantive relationships with government departments to inform and 
influence their own work and to seek to shape central government thinking on issues 
relating to LEPs. Relations between LEPs and other institutions and functions 
centralised following the dismantling of the RDAs such as the Technology Strategy 
Board and UK Trade and Investment were uneven. Some LEPs had agreed formal 
memoranda of understanding while others had not. The unevenness of the local-centre 
relations was reinforcing the picture of a cadre of more capable LEPs pulling ahead of 
the rest in developing their contact networks and deal-making skills with central 
government as well as capacity and ability to influence local growth in their areas. 
 
The relations between LEPs and their respective BIS Locals were revealed as positive 
and supportive. As discussed in relation to organisation and governance, LEP-local 
authority relations were pivotal to LEP role and effectiveness. Securing and sustaining 
business engagement is a critical element in the rationale for LEPs but has become a 
challenging task. With some LEPs already experiencing turnover in their business 
sector board members (including Chairs) as terms of office come to an end. In terms 
of joint and cross-boundary working, some LEPs have begun to consider joint 
working and even merging operations, whilst some local authorities, such as the City of 
York, have looked to cement their membership in one LEP (i.e. Leeds City Region) 
rather than be members of two LEPs54.  
 
  
                                                 
54 For example, an options paper drawn up by Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire LEP has suggested 
merging with Leicester and Leicestershire LEP: http://www.lgcplus.com/news/exclusive-east-midlands-lep-merger-
discussed/5058872.article 
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7. Innovations 
As a source of new ideas and knowledge, institutions are potential fonts of innovation 
in addressing local economic growth issues. As new institutions with limited resources 
working within a context of chronic low growth and state austerity in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, LEPs have been effectively forced to innovate. The cliché of 
‘necessity as the mother of invention’ was used by several LEPs to describe their 
ingenuity in the context of scarce resources. Innovations were evident across the LEPs 
in their early years. Initiatives ranged from adaptive innovation in traditional local 
growth areas (e.g. business support hubs/portals, managing GPF) to formative work 
on topics such as retail, ageing, water, and coastal management. A critical issue for the 
future development of the LEPs is how strategic, sustainable and transferable are LEP 
innovations – especially given the competing demands of new purposes and the need 
for stronger information and knowledge sharing amongst the LEPs, tempered by their 
sometimes competitive inter-relations. 
 
8. Lessons learned and capacity building 
As “carriers of history”55, institutions inform the behaviour of actors in relation to 
economic growth by acting as repositories of behaviour, experience, knowledge and 
practice – knowing what works and what does not work where and when in particular 
local contexts. In this way, institutions play a critical role against a backdrop of scarce 
resources and heightened government concern with effective public policy and value 
for money56. While in the early stages of their evolution, the LEPs have had to engage 
in intensive ‘learning by doing’, negotiating a complex, uncertain and unfolding policy 
and funding landscape – often further complicated by mixed and conflicting messages 
from government Ministers from different government departments and even 
Ministers within the same government departments. Fundamentally, it seems as if the 
relationships between the Government’s ‘Local (economic) Growth’ and ‘Cities’ 
agendas are not always clearly defined and articulated. Reflection and learning from 
                                                 
55 David, P. A. (1994) “Why are institutions the ‘carriers of history’?: Path dependence and the evolution of conventions, 
organizations and institutions”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5, 2, 205-220. 
56 Cabinet Office (2013) What Works: Evidence Centres for Social Policy, Cabinet Office: London. 
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their existing practice as institutions has informed the identification of issues for 
building LEP capacity. 
 
While relatively early days in their development, the fledgling LEPs identified a number 
of lessons learned from their experiences. First, in the context of their limited size and 
resources, partnership building was critical to the LEPs, especially in establishing 
working relationships with new partners and building local delivery capacity. Second, 
managing the key strategic relationships in the nexus between the troika of the 
business board members, local authorities and central government was hugely 
important from the outset. Third, securing the services of strong and capable Chairs 
was revealed as pivotal. Chairs were required that were able to lead, define and 
articulate what the LEP was for and what it was about, development and communicate 
strategy and priorities, and lead on the strategic relationship management. Fourth, 
while difficult and challenging in a complex and shifting landscape of economic 
development governance involving multiple actors across multiple levels, developing 
appropriate governance arrangements is becoming an urgent issue for LEPs, 
heightened by the impending increases in their resources and responsibilities. Last, 
LEPs were conscious of the need to embed evaluation into their activities to ensure 
assessment yardsticks are integrated into their work to enable understanding of where, 
when and if they are adding value and making a difference on local economic growth.  
 
As institutions in their infancy, substantive capacity building issues were identified 
across the 39 LEPs. Although importantly, to date there has been little systematic and 
collective thought given to their long-term institutional development needs. Many 
LEPs have had to hit the ground running and operate on a tactical basis at breakneck 
speed without having time to consider and reflect upon their future trajectory. Indeed, 
the rapid establishment of the LEPs, short-term demands and lack of legislative basis 
have prompted some anxieties about their longevity and sustainability, especially in the 
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context of the history of institutional churn and periodic reorganisations of economic 
development governance in England57. 
 
In terms of building their capacity, first, many LEPs were particularly protective and 
concerned to develop their individuality, often actively taking a competitive stance vis-
à-vis other LEPs to progress their ambitions. Second, LEPs embraced the potential of 
localism and developing their autonomy, with some displaying an instinctive scepticism 
about national processes and, in some cases, even the contribution of The LEP 
Network58. Third, some recognition is evident on shared concerns across the LEPs on 
a case-by-case (e.g. VAT or European Funding) or ‘good neighbour’ (e.g. strategic 
transport and/or spatial planning) basis.59 Some LEPs were able to identify wider and 
often longer-term issues where collaboration would make sense, including learning 
‘what works where and when’ and not ‘reinventing wheels’, functional issues like EU 
programmes or dealing with Local Transport Boards or Skills Boards. Last, however, 
was the growing sense amongst LEPs of the need for a step change in their capacity 
given the potentially increased powers and resources and demands to deliver on 
Government agendas to 2015 and beyond. 
 
9. Conclusions 
As critics of the role of institutions in distorting or causing malfunctions in the 
operation of the market processes underlying economic growth are quick to point out, 
individual institutions and sets of institutional arrangements do not offer 
straightforward and/or optimal solutions60. Alternative views interpret institutions as 
critical parts of the adaptive capacity of local economies to cope with disruptive change 
and foster resilience to withstand, bounce back and reinvigorate economic growth 
                                                 
57 Pike, A. and Tomaney, J. (2009) “The State and uneven development: The governance of economic development in 
England in post-devolution UK”, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 2, 1, 13-34. 
58 In an article in Regeneration and Renewal (25 June 2013), it was reported that the 39 LEP Chairs were seeking to 
reform the national umbrella organisation for the LEPs: http://www.lgcplus.com/news/lep-network-faces-arab-
spring/5060242.article 
59 Local Authorities, such as the South East 7, are also working together on joint issues such as public sector efficiencies 
and spatial planning.  
60 Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A (2004) “Do institutions cause growth?”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 9, 271-303. 
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following shock events61. In this context, where the LEPs in England have got to in 
their institutional development is part of responding to the call for “a richer account of 
where good institutions come from, the shape they take, and how they need to evolve 
to support long-term growth” (Rodrik 2003: 12). Connecting to the international 
interest in the role of institutions in economic growth and three years on from the 
invitation to local actors from the Secretaries of State in DBIS and DCLG, this study 
sought to take stock of where the LEPs are at and where they are heading by analysing 
their strategies and priorities, organisation and governance, resources, effectiveness and 
working relations, innovations, lessons learned, and future barriers and challenges. 
 
Although diversity and variety is marked across the 39 LEPs, their role and 
contribution is being compromised by a fragmented and shifting landscape of 
economic development governance and the absence of a longer-term vision and 
strategy for their development. While the Heseltine review, the Government’s response 
and the announcements in the CSR 2013 have attempted to address this issue, 
fundamental concerns still remain. The task of resolving the direction and nature of 
the strategic development of the LEPs is troubled by a number of fundamental 
tensions. First, Government appears torn and able only to find uneasy balances 
between centralism and localism – demonstrated most recently in the process it plans 
to follow in agreeing Strategic Economic Plans for LEPs and the competitive 
allocation mechanism for the Local Growth Fund. On one side, Government has 
centralised in some key areas against the backdrop of austerity, deficit reduction and 
the search for efficiencies, savings and value for money. On the other side, 
Government has at the same time promoted ‘Localism’ of various forms and 
decentralised responsibility in key areas. This approach has created an uneven and 
complex landscape of economic development governance. It involves multiple actors 
at geographical multiple levels – supranational, national, local, city, city-regional, 
community, neighbourhood – overseen by questionable systems of accountability, 
responsibility and transparency. This uncertain and unfolding picture absorbs huge 
                                                 
61 Metcalfe, J. S., Foster, J. and Ramlogan, R. (2006) “Adaptive economic growth”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1, 
7-32; Pike, A., Dawley, S. and Tomaney, J. (2010) “Resilience, adaptation and adaptability”, Cambridge Journal of 
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amounts of time and effort to interpret amongst the LEPs and their partners. 
Deciphering this complex and moving picture to develop strategic and longer-term 
views on local economic growth is difficult and problematic for local actors. 
 
Second, it is unresolved whether the LEPs are or should be competitors and/or 
collaborators. The Government’s Local Growth agenda is enthusiastic about 
competition in driving-up economic performance and fostering innovation. Several 
from the Government’s array of mechanisms for allocating funding are based on 
competitive principles. But given the relatively small size, capability and resources of 
some LEPs and the challenges of addressing large scale and longer-term constraints on 
local economic growth, the rationale of co-operation between LEPs has been mooted 
too. Lord Heseltine raised the question of the geographies of the LEPs in better 
matching functional economic areas and avoiding overlap, and encouraging joint 
working between LEPs and other partners where appropriate62. In a collaborative 
model, the benefits of knowledge exchange and learning might be spread out across 
‘LEP-land’. If rebalancing is still a serious Government concern rather than just a 
rhetorical device then some thought on how the overall system inter-relates and works 
might help. Where does Government see the appropriate balance between competition 
and co-operation? More capable and stronger LEPs forging ahead? Less capable and 
weaker LEPs failing? Consolidation and merger reducing the number of LEPs? 
Incentives to co-operate on shared issues? Across the 39 institutions, there is a risk of 
more capable and stronger LEPs in the already more economically prosperous areas 
pulling ahead; leaving less capable and weaker LEPs struggling to keep up – even 
failing and merging. Is Government prepared to let this process unfold in a laissez-faire 
fashion? Will a new version of the initial ‘white spaces’ not covered by LEPs emerge 
and be acceptable? Or will Government attempt to encourage neighbouring LEPs to 
absorb areas and engineer territorial mergers amongst LEPs?  
 
Third, given the growing roles and responsibilities being accumulated by the LEPs – 
on EU Structural and Investment Funds, Strategic Economic Plans and funding bids, 
                                                 
62 Heseltine, M. (2012) No Stone Unturned in Pursuit of Growth, DBIS: London. 
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EZs, GPF, RGF and the LGF amongst others – there is concern about 
‘bureaucratisation’ and whether or not they can maintain their agility and business-led 
focus. Whether or not business leaders will stay engaged and contribute to LEPs as 
they become more oriented to bidding for and planning to use available public funding 
streams will be critical. A central question is will the breadth of ambition for and 
expectation of LEPs, stimulated by Government’s response to Heseltine, crowd-out 
and distort their organic growth as private sector-led, robust, viable, locally-
owned/valued and sustainable institutions? 
 
Fourth, the study confirmed the widely held belief that the LEPs are working with 
limited capacity and resources. It went further too in detailing the extent and 
geographical variation of staffing and finances. The Government’s mixed models of 
funding allocation – uniform and competitive – have reinforced this geographically 
uneven picture. For a Government wrestling with the tension between centralism and 
localism in focusing on LEPs to try and get local growth off the ground, there 
continues to be questions about whether or not LEPs have appropriate and sufficient 
capability and resources to deliver. The clamour for more powers and funding has 
grown. 
 
Last, for the ‘LEP Family’, there is the issue of whether or not it develops a more 
coherent voice and begins to articulate its collective interests with Government. This 
could include issues currently within and beyond the scope of LEPs, for example the 
future direction of City Deals, Combined Authorities and the Local Growth Fund, 
local authorities, or other role players (e.g. universities, government agencies etc.). The 
survey revealed that many LEPs welcomed the more direct relationship with Central 
Government in the absence of the regional tier of institutions. But as the limits of the 
current centre-local relations and deal-making nature of public resource allocation 
become more apparent in the unevenness and inconsistency with which Central 
Government is dealing with each LEP, will the LEPs (and/or others) turn – in Lord 
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Heseltine’s words “revolt”63 – and start making more specific demands on powers and 
funding, especially given the disappointment felt by many at the size and format of the 
Local Growth Fund? 
 
Our conclusions, then, are that given the lack of long-term vision and strategy for their 
strategic development, the fundamental tensions yet to be resolved and their 
institutional deficits in authority, capability and resources, at this stage in their 
evolution the LEPs will struggle to exercise substantive influence upon local economic 
growth. Continued state austerity, chronic low growth and brittle and uncertain 
economic conditions in the short and medium-term will further trouble this central 
task. 
 
Even given the history of flux and institutional churn in the governance arrangements 
for economic development in England and the alphabet soup of acronyms of the 
institutions of previous eras, in the context of state austerity amongst the relevant 
actors it was felt that LEPs were likely be around for a while with little prospect of 
radical change whatever the outcome of the General Election in 2015. This perspective 
was articulated by the Shadow Business Secretary, Chuka Ummuna, in a speech to the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 2013 Conference:  
 
We [the Labour Party] welcomed Lord Heseltine’s review, and wished the 
Government had gone further, matching their rhetoric with action...we will seek 
to build on Local Enterprise Partnerships. Tweaking and strengthening where 
necessary. Matching the capacity to play a greater leadership role with clearer 
accountability. 
 
Amongst the local actors there is little appetite for further institutional change and 
upheaval, the costs and disbenefits of which were still being felt by many in the wake 
                                                 
63 Geoghegan, J. (2013) “Heseltine urges LEPs to ‘revolt’ against Whitehall for greater powers”, Regeneration and 
Renewal, 19 April, http://www.planningresource.co.uk/news/1179124/heseltine-urges-leps-revolt-against-whitehall-
greater-powers/; Accessed: 14 June 2013. 
 37
of the dismantling of the regional tier64. Fundamentally, local actors were trying to get 
on with the job of growing prosperity locally. “LEPs may come and go but the 
rationale for the local partnerships remain” as one local actor put it (Authors’ 
Interview, 2013). Yet, looking from the outside in, as a way of organising the 
institutional arrangements for economic development the LEPs in England look 
relatively small and seriously under-powered for the task in an international context of 
competition for the resources critical to economic growth including investment, jobs 
and innovation.  
 
In broader institutional development terms, there are two final points we would seek 
to make. First, whilst there may be a lack of appetite for ‘revolutionary’ institutional 
reform post-2015 (perhaps influenced by the recent experience with the dismantling of 
regional institutional architecture in 2010-11), it is likely that the geographies, roles and 
functions, and governance of LEPs, will significantly change post-2015. This will partly 
build on the experience of intensive (and ‘game-changing’) LEP task-based activity 
between 2013 and 2015. However, it will also be highly influenced by the language and 
approach of a new Government of whatever political colour(s). The narratives of 
deficit reduction, localism and rebalancing redolent of the current era will surely be 
supplanted by an incoming administration with new language and stories.  
 
Second, despite popular orthodoxy, LEPs are not “the only game in town”65 in the 
institutional landscape of sub-national development in England. Local authorities are 
collectively progressing Combined Authorities, Community Budgets and a ‘rewiring’ of 
national and local government in the midst of unprecedented fiscal consolidation and 
public expenditure reductions.66 In another domain, associations of universities and 
research institutions are seeking a narrative for sub-national development of the 
knowledge economy. LEPs need to work collectively both to deliver the 2013-15 
agenda effectively; but also to think about and craft a position for their roles and 
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functions in the leadership of local economic growth in the long term. If we accept the 
premise that institutions are (one of the) ‘fundamental determinants of economic 
growth’, the need for LEPs to undertake this longer-term deliberation on their role in 
sub-national economic development landscapes, as institutions in their own right, will 
become an increasingly important priority as the 2015 General Election approaches.   
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